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19 June 1959

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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Japan: Prime Minister Kishi has probably strengthened his control in the new cabinet announced on 18 June by appointing his supporters to most of the key posts. The inclusion of Hayato Ikeda, a top leader of the ruling Liberal-Democratic party who formerly opposed Kishi, will broaden support for Kishi's pro-US policies. The refusal of Ichiro Kono, an aspirant to the prime ministership, to accept a party or cabinet post leaves him as a rallying point for continued party factionalism.

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### III. THE WEST

Haiti:

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Although opposition groups remain divided, they have

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DAILY BRIEF

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succeeded in conducting a series of bombings and other public disorders in recent days. The government feels itself trapped between Castro and Trujillo, and three top Haitian officials displayed "almost hysterical fear" while discussing the political situation with Ambassador Drew on 15 June.

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Nicaragua: Nicaraguan rebel leaders in exile, chagrined over the failure of the invasions early this month by political moderates based in Costa Rica, have turned in desperation to Cuban Prime Minister Castro for assistance and also appear inclined to accept the support of pro-Communist revolutionary groups in the Caribbean area for a new effort against the Somoza regime.

#### IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding week)

25X1  
Outlook For West Africa Through 1960. NIE 70-59. 16 June 1959.

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Soviet Tactics on Berlin. SNIE 100-7-59. 11 June 1959.

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New Japanese Government

Prime Minister Kishi appears to have strengthened his position by placing his supporters in most of the key positions of his new cabinet, while still providing for representatives from some of the major factions in his ruling Liberal-Democratic party. Foreign Minister Aiichiro Fujiyama and Finance Minister Eisaku Sato are the only holdovers in the cabinet, which will face an all-out fight with the Socialists over consideration of the US-Japan Security Treaty at the Diet session this fall.

The entry of Hayato Ikeda, a top leader of a party faction which previously opposed Kishi's leadership, will probably broaden support for Japan's policy of cooperation with the United States. Financial interests in Japan are generally pleased over the inclusion of Ikeda as minister of international trade and industry and view his appointment as a continuation of sound financial policies.

Kishi was unable to satisfy all party groups, and the refusal of Ichiro Kono--an aspirant to the prime ministership--to accept a party or cabinet post leaves him as a rallying point for continued party factionalism. Kono has publicly threatened that he will no longer cooperate with the government because Kishi refused to appoint him secretary general of the party. He could cause Kishi trouble over the revision of the security treaty and relations with Communist China by cooperating with the Socialists.

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Haitian Opposition Groups Plan Increased Terrorism

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The Duvalier government, dependent for survival on the President's secret police, has become increasingly unpopular during its year and a half in power. Opposition elements have been quick to exploit the confusion within the régime resulting from Duvalier's heart attack on 24 May, which will probably prevent his return to active politics for several more weeks. Although divided, the opposition may succeed in stirring up considerable unrest, and the armed forces, alienated by Duvalier's continuing efforts to undermine their power, cannot be relied upon to support the government.

Three top Haitian officials--including the chief of the secret police--while discussing the political situation with Ambassador Drew on 15 June, displayed "almost hysterical fear" that Haiti might be caught between its two hostile and more powerful neighbors, Cuba and the Dominican Republic. Foreign Minister Mars requested that US naval vessels increase visits to Port-au-Prince to act as a deterrent to a possible invasion from abroad.

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Nicaraguan Rebels Seek Cuban Assistance

Nicaraguan rebel leaders in exile are turning in desperation to Cuban Prime Minister Castro for assistance following the failure early this month of the invasion of Nicaragua by political moderates based in Costa Rica.

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The American Embassy in Havana has become convinced that the Cuban Government is supporting revolutionary expeditions against the Nicaraguan and Dominican governments.

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Nicaraguan armed forces chief Somoza told the American Embassy late on 17 June that he was expecting an attack by an armed band from Costa Rica early on 19 June. The leader of this band, Costa Rican revolutionary veteran Frank Marshall, has threatened to use force if Costa Rican President Echandi attempts to prevent the departure of his group for Nicaragua.

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The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

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Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

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